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NOTES
RACE RELATIONS AND SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING: JURISPRUDENTIAL REFLECTIONS
I. Introduction
On July 25, 1974, the Supreme Court decided Milliken v. Bradley.' The
district court had previously held that the Detroit public school system was ra-
cially segregated because of various practices and policies pursued by the Detroit
Board of Education and the State of Michigan. The court ordered the Detroit
Board of Education to submit several desegregation plans for the tricounty
metropolitan Detroit area. After considering the submitted desegregation plans,
the district court rejected the Detroit-only plan as ineffectual. Effective desegre-
gation of the school system required suburban school districts in the metropolitan
area to be included in the proposed desegregation plan.2 The decision of the
district court was affirmed by the court of appeals.' But in a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court concluded that the relief deemed appropriate by these two courts
was based on an erroneous standard and not supported by evidence of any dis-
criminatory acts by the included suburban school districts.
This momentous decision was purportedly decided on the neutral principle
of law that lower federal courts have only limited equitable powers to impose a
multidistrict metropolitan remedy where there is no showing of de jure segre-
gation by the surrounding suburban school districts. According to the Supreme
Court, the formula to be followed is a simple one: Since the Detroit Board of
Education committed acts of de jure segregation, the city's public school system
must be desegregated. Conversely, the lack of evidence showing the suburban
school districts included in the metropolitan school desegregation plan to have
committed acts of de jure segregation removes the districts from inclusion in any
desegregation plan ordered by the federal courts. Thus, this supposedly neutral
principle of law precludes the use of metropolitan desegregation plans, one of the
few effective remedies available to eliminate school segregation in Northern cities.
The majority of the Court ignored the fact that segregation in Northern
cities and schools is not accidental. Many Northern states once mandated segre-
gation in public schools by law. Moreover, Northern states were directly im-
plicated in policies establishing segregated housing patterns.4 Segregation has
been perpetuated by racially restrictive ordinances and covenants, by the plan-
ning decisions of state and local governments, and by the policies and practices
of state and city school boards. Accordingly, government at every level has con-
tributed to this pattern of segregation.5 Not surprisingly, then, governmental in-
volvement is also present in the Milliken case. The record of the case clearly
1 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
2 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
3 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
4 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
21-22 (1967).
5 Id. at 25.
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demonstrates that the State of Michigan, through its officers and agencies, en-
gaged in calculated and purposeful acts which directly contributed to the segre-
gation of the Detroit public school system.' It was the State of Michigan, not
the Detroit Board of Education, that bore the responsibility for remedying the
segregation found in the Detroit public schools. That the Court did not take a
more comprehensive and realistic view is surely a tragedy.'
The Milliken decision is not only a disappointing step backward in the
struggle to achieve school desegregation, but, in a broader sense, it is also a dis-
illusioning decision for those who believe that human dignity inheres in all men.
Human dignity is not served by inadequate city schools preparing black students
for their "inferior" status in society. While the Court in Milliken purports to
apply a morally neutral formula, its decision is not neutral for either blacks or
whites. The failure of the Milliken decision is not that the majority took a value
position, but that the value position taken is indefensible. Bradley v. Milliken
exemplifies the inescapable nonneutrality of Supreme Court decision-making.
Although cast in the mold of impartial and disinterested legal discourse, it has,
in the area of race relations, significant political and moral underpinnings.
The concept of neutral principles is vulnerable and objectionable on three
grounds. First, neutral principles as a tool of objective analysis is suspect when
viewed in light of the physical and social sciences' experience with objectivity.
The problem of objectivity in the physical and social sciences is more complex
than was initially anticipated. Second, political science' and American con-
stitutional history9 cast additional suspicion on the concept of neutral principles.
These disciplines suggest that the quest for neutral principles of constitutional
adjudication, especially in the area of race relations, is misleading and futile.
Third, the concept of neutral principles is vulnerable and objectionable on moral
grounds because it does not consider the range of human rights that the law
should guarantee to all persons. The concept is not a useful tool with which to
secure political, economic, and social rights-rights which must be secured if
human dignity is ever to be more than an ideal.' We need a teleological juris-
prudence, a jurisprudence that has as its central value an active and vigorous
concern with human dignity. The implementation of such a jurisprudence
should be a major function of the Supreme Court." The Court, in a variety of
6 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 "[T]he Court today takes a giant step backwards. Notwithstanding a record showing
widespread and pervasive racial segregation in the educational system provided by the State
of Michigan for children in Detroit, this Court holds that the District Court was powerless to
require the State to remedy its constitutional violation in any meaningful fashion. Ironically
purporting to base its result on the principle that the scope of the remedy in a desegregation
case should be determined by the nature and the extent of the constitutional violation, the
Court's answer is to provide no remedy at all for the violation proved, in this case, thereby
guaranteeing that Negro children in Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently
unequal education in the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past."
Id. at 782.
8 See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, LAW A" PoLrrics IN THE SUPREME COURT (1964).
9 See, e.g., C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1943).
10 T. HESBURGH, THE HUMANE IMPERATIVE 33 (1974). See also W. TAYLOR, HANGING
TOGETHER: EQUALITY IN AN URBAN NATION (1971).
11 Many of the cases decided by the Supreme Court could be viewed in terms of human
dignity. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952). See also E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
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contexts, has relied on the concept of human dignity in making decisions. There
is, therefore, some precedent for a jurisprudence of human dignity, a juris-
prudence that defies neutrality in an effort to approximate the best interests of
justice.
II. Neutral Principles, Political Jurisprudence, and
Constitutional History
A. Neutral Principles
One of the consistent themes in modem physical and social science is that
man's value preferences invariably guide his choice. The critical treatment of
objectivity found in the literature of modem physical and social science 2 sug-
gests that the concept of neutral principles be treated with grave suspicion and
intense concern. If objectivity is elusive in the physical and social sciences, the
inference is that it is the same in constitutional law. An examination of the
concept of neutral principles in the context of political jurisprudence and con-
stitutional history provides a test of this inference.
Professor Herbert Wechsler has viewed the ad hoe evaluation of Supreme
Court cases as "the deepest problem of our constitutionalism."" Wechsler con-
tends that the Court has a duty to reach its decision according to standards that
transcend the case at hand. 4 He finds this duty both in the language of the
Constitution and in history. The Court functions effectively, he argues, by reach-
ing principled decisions.
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on rea-
sons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality
and neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. When no
sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices
of the other branches of Government or of a state, those choices must, of
course, survive.15
Advocacy of neutral principles is essentially an attack on result-oriented
jurisprudence. It is an attack on those who judge Supreme Court decisions in
terms of social and economic results, contending that the Court should not be
swayed by possible consequences of its decisions since reason and consistency are
more important than results. It would have the Justices approach their task of
adjudication with a predilection for reason and consistency, ignoring social and
political ramifications. Conflicting social interests must be dealt with in a neutral,
impartial manner.1
12 See, e.g., E. CA.DIN, THE PowER AND LmIrs OF SCIENCE (1949); E. CARR, WHAT IS
HISTORY? (1964); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970); K.
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936); G. MYRDAL, OBJEcTIVITY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH
(1969); M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958).
13 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rsv. 1, 12
(1959).
14 Id. at 17.
15 Id. at 19.
16 Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral
Principles, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587, 593 (1963).
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This analysis ignores the fact that choices between competing interests are
impossible without employing value preferences." Difficult social and legal
problems simply do not lend themselves to any one accepted standard or measure.
The Justices are guided by their values and preferences as they choose between
the competing values represented by litigants.' The Court's use of these values
as a touchstone in its political and governmental function is the basis of political
jurisprudence. 9
B. Political Jurisprudence
Political jurisprudence vigorously denies the existence of judicial neutrality
when the Supreme Court decides a momentous social issue. The central tenet
of political jurisprudence is that the Supreme Court is one of the many integrated
agencies of American Government." The tendency to view the Court in isolation
stems from the Court's power of judicial review." Political jurisprudence is an
attempt to move away from this narrow and restrictive view. It is an amalgam
of sociological jurisprudence and legal realism combined with the substantive
knowledge and methodology of political science.22
Sociological jurisprudence views law as a social instrument and the legal
process as a balancing mechanism capable of reconciling potentially conflicting
interests.22 It marks a departure from the orthodox theory of the judicial func-
tion because it views the judge as a social engineer, balancing competing social
interests.24 Legal realism views judges and courts with considerable skepticism. 5
The legal realists criticized declaratory theories of law which asserted that judges
"had no choice but to reach one decision, or that they were coerced by rules
which they were powerless to modify."26 In attacking the judicial myth of ob-
jective, neutral decision-making by logical deductions from established principles,
the realists focused on what the Court did rather than on what it said.2
Political jurisprudence views the Court as a political institution and the
Justices as political actors. The Court becomes an integral part of the structure
of American government, similar to other political institutions. The Justices
17 The plea for neutral principles is more than faintly reminiscent of the hoary theory
that judges find law rather than make it. See, e.g., D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE
OF THE LAW (1941).
18 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 596.
19 See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (1960); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1958).
20 " [O]ur fascination with the Supreme Court as a unique phenomenon of American his-
tory, and with the constitutional format that establishes it as one of the three separate and
coequal branches of national government, tends to thrust the Court out of the context of
interrelated committees and commissions, services and bureaus in which we examine most
problems of American government." M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
COURT 2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND POLITICS].
21 M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 25 (1971).
22 LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 20, at 15.
23 See, e.g., B. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); R. POUND,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922).
24 F. CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 94 (1952).
25 See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH
(1960); F. RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU LAWYERS (1939).
26 W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 106 (1968).
27 LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 20, at 15.
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take their places with the Congressmen, bureaucrats, and technicians who make
the political decisions of government.2 ,
Obviously, political jurisprudence and neutral principles are in direct con-
flict. The quest for neutral principles of constitutional law, advocated by Pro-
fessor Wechsler and his followers, is an attempt to take the Court out of the
"shabby" business of politics. The concept of neutral principles appeals to those
individuals who believe in the ancient notion of a "government of laws and not
of men," and who tenaciously maintain that law can rule without the inter-
vention of the human element.2 " A discussion of American constitutional his-
tory, however, dispels this fallacious contention, for much of American constitu-
tional history illustrates the political nature of Supreme Court decision-making.
C. Constitutional History
1. Marbury, Fletcher, and the Marshall Court: Early Political Decisions of the
Supreme Court
In 1801, with the first change of administration under the new Constitution,
there was a bitter struggle for control of the federal courts. Historians have
viewed this struggle as essentially political.2 0 Early in 1801 the Federalists passed
a bill authorizing President Adams to create a number of judicial positions for
the District of Columbia. During the last days of his administration, Adams
filled these posts with Federalist Party faithfuls. When the new Democratic-
Republican administration came into power, however, it discovered that a num-
ber of the commissions were undelivered. When administration officials refused
to deliver William Marbury's commission, he sought judicial relief, requesting
that the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of
State to deliver his commission. In Marbury v. Madison," the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff had a right to his commission and that the law afforded
him a remedy, but the proper remedy was not mandamus.
In the course of this deceptively simple opinion, Chief Justice Marshall
chastised his bitter enemy, Jefferson, while establishing the principle of judicial
supremacy. The genius of the decision lies in its political nature, for the reason-
ing of the decision has been thoroughly repudiated."2 By emphasizing an insignif-
icant point of legal procedure, Marshall outmaneuvered his political opponents.
Surely there was a significant political relationship between Marshall's enuncia-
tion of the doctrine of judicial supremacy and his Federalist political philosophy.
There are, therefore, no neutral principles of constitutional law in Marbury.
Fletcher v. Peck33 is another example of the political nature of Supreme
Court decision-making. It is "vintage Marshall" on the subject of property
28 Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294, 297 (1964).
29 Miller, Some Pervasive Myths About the United States Supreme Court, 10 ST. Louis
U. LJ. 153, 171 (1965).
30 See, e.g., R. ELLIs, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC (1971).
31 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32 See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuxE L.J. 1.
33 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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rights."- Indeed, it stands as a lasting example of Marshall's intense devotion to
vested property rights. In 1795, the Georgia legislature granted 35 million acres
to several private land companies for less than two cents an acre. All but one
of the Georgia state legislators who voted for the bill had been bribed. 5 In
1796, a new state legislature repealed the earlier grant to the land companies,
voiding all property rights attached to it.2 In the interim the land companies
had been selling tracts of land to third parties. After a sham sale of land by one
of the land companies, and a sham lawsuit over the title, the constitutionality of
the Georgia Legislature's repeal act came before the Supreme Court."7
In Fletcher, Marshall voided the Georgia repeal act, despite the blatant
corruption of the previous legislature and the obviously contrived nature of the
suit, because it conflicted with the Constitution's contract clause forbidding state
impairment of contract obligations. Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck made
the contract clause a leading bulwark for private property interests for over half
a century." His decision elevated vested property rights to a position of primacy
in the hierarchy of constitutional values. This was clearly consistent with
Marshall's Federalist political philosophy. The decision reflected not only his
personal beliefs, but those of his party. Federalist political philosophy emphasized
property rights, and with this decision property rights were read into the contract
clause. Clearly the decision did not result from the use of neutral principles of
constitutional law, for there was nothing neutral about Marshall's strong concern
for property rights. This zealous regard for property rights also can be seen in
many of Marshall's proslavery decisions. 9
Under Marshall's leadership the Court began its long and pathetic history
of condoning the inhuman treatment of blacks in the South. Marshall's tolerance
of slavery flowed from his belief that the property rights of slaveholders were
preeminent." One searches in vain for some neutral principle of constitutional
law to explain Marshall's proslavery decisions. The belief in the primacy of
property rights over human rights may be a principle, but surely it is not a neutral
principle. When property rights are unduly emphasized, as they have been
throughout much of American history,4' human rights are often relegated to a
lower level in the hierarchy of constitutional values. Unfortunately, the Court's
sensitivity toward property rights and insensitivity toward human rights were
continued by the Taney Court. 2
34 C. MAGRATH, YAzoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEw REPUBLIC 75 (1966).
35 Id. at 7.
36 Id. at 13.
37 Id. at 54.
38 "The post-Civil War period saw the high point of Contract Clause jurisprudence. The
principles developed under Marshall were applied to the new factual situations presented by
the accelerated industrial expansion that characterized the latter part of the century ....
In Marshall's hands ... the Contract Clause was to become a protection for property rights
comparable to that furnished by the Due-Process Clause itself in the post-1890 period." B.
SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 268-69 (1965).
39 Marshall's tender regard for property rights over human rights is illustrated in The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); Negress Sally v. Ball, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1
(1816); Scot v. Negroe Ben, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 3 (1810); Scot v. Negroe London, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 324 (1806).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., R. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
42 See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). In Prigg, the Court
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2. Political Decisions of the Supreme Court in Race Relation Cases
Just as the decisions in the Marbury and Fletcher cases were political deci-
sions, so also was the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.45 In his majority
opinion, Chief Justice Taney concluded that the writers of the Declaration of
Independence and the framers of the Constitution never intended blacks to be
citizens." Taney sought to justify his decision by drawing a distinction between
national and state citizenship, which was of no consequence for whites but had
grave implications for blacks. His doctrine of dual citizenship was a clever con-
ceptual scheme designed to give the states complete control over blacks. Under
the doctrine of dual citizenship, blacks could have no political or civil rights
unless they were granted by a state government, and these rights would be
operative only within that state's borders. It was impossible under Taney's doc-
trine for a, black to obtain national citizenship." In effect, Taney was stripping
Congress of all power to control the growth of slavery in the territories.46 Surely
there was nothing neutral about this purely political decision. There were no
neutral principles of constitutional law at work here. "Politics flooded into the
case from every direction, just as politics has always flooded, seeped, or trickled
into every important Supreme Court case." ''
After the Civil War new guarantees were written into the Constitution.
The Civil War amendments made blacks citizens of the United States and of
the states in which they resided. The framers of these amendments intended that
blacks be part of the body politic enjoying equally with whites the privileges and
immunities conferred by the Constitution." This dream of an egalitarian society
was soon shattered by the Supreme Court. The Court began emasculating the
Civil War amendments in the Slaughter House Cases.49 The issue there was
whether a property right-the right to make a living-was one of the privileges
and immunities guaranteed to citizens of the United States by the fourteenth
amendment. The Court, drawing upon Taney's discredited doctrine of dual
citizenship, held that there were still two categories of citizenship. The privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment protected those rights which
flowed from national citizenship. The rights which were derived from national
citizenship were narrowly defined; state citizenship, however, included all civil
rights.-" The Court was aware that the states would not protect the civil rights of
blacks, yet the Court effectively precluded Congress from doing so. The Court's
held that a black could be taken by a bounty hunter from a nonslave state to a slave state
with the nonslave state having no power to require a judicial hearing to determine whether
or not the black was a slave.
43 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
44 Blacks were "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by
the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority,
and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government
might choose to grant them" 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-405 (1857).
45 L. MILLER, TH. PETIONERS 73 (1966).
46 Id. at 79.
47 F. RODELL, NINE MEN 129 (1955).
48 MILLER, supra note 45, at 101.
49 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
50 For an example of how the revived dual citizenship concept was used to render nuga-
tory the rights granted to blacks by the Civil War amendments, see United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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deliberate weakening of the Civil War amendments was not based on any neutral
principle of constitutional law. The purpose of the decision was to nullify the
intention of the radical Republicans to protect blacks from discriminatory state
laws.
The Court completed its deliberate destruction of the egalitarian Recon-
struction amendments in the Civil Rights Cases." The Civil Rights Act of 1875
prohibited discrimination against blacks in places of public accommodations.
The Court held that Congress had no authority to pass this legislation because
the fourteenth amendment prohibited discrimination only by the states, not by
private persons. This decision permitted individuals and corporations to dis-
criminate against blacks; it intentionally sanctioned caste lines." The Civil
Rights Cases virtually assured the subsequent development of Jim Crow laws.5
In 1877, federal troops were withdrawn from the South as part of a political
compromise. The decision in the Civil Rights Cases seemed a validation of that
compromise.5"
In Plessy v. Ferguson,55 the Court again exhibited its political nature. The
Court held that state-sanctioned racial separation of passengers on a railroad
car was not repugnant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which merely required that equal facilities be provided for both whites
and blacks. By approving Jim Crow laws, the Court encouraged the further
growth of segregation.5" Again one searches in vain for a neutral principle of
constitutional law in Plessy, or for objective standards that transcend the issue
decided.
Plessy and the other previously examined cases clearly depict the Court in
its typical value-laden, political role. They clearly refute the concept of neutral
principles in Supreme Court decision-making. All major constitutional decisions,
whether they be moral, immoral, or amoral, are value-oriented political deci-
sions. To criticize the Court because it has abandoned its "proper" role as an
apolitical institution, or because it does not articulate neutral principles as the
basis for its decisions, is meaningless. Even a cursory reading of the cases pre-
viously examined demonstrates that .the Court espouses certain values. The task
of constitutional scholarship, then, is one of attempting to determine those values
which the Court should openly espouse.
51 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
52 The immediate consequence of this decision "was that racial discrimination increased
by leaps and bounds. Americans tend to regard as moral and permissible that which is said
to be constitutional. Private persons and corporations . . . drew increasingly rigid color lines
in the exercise of what they came to regard as their constitutionally protected right to discrimi-
nate at will." MILLER, supra note 45, at 147.
53 R. LooA, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 116 (1965).
54 C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND R.EACTION 245 (1951).
55 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
56 Jim Crow laws "put the authority of the state or city in the voice of the streetcar con-
ductor, the railway brakeman, the bus driver, the theater usher, and also into the voice of
the hoodlum of the public parks and playgrounds. They gave free rein and the majesty of
the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted or deflected."
C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 107 (3d ed. 1974).
57 "At no time in American constitutional history can it be said that the demand for
'principled decision-making' has been fulfilled. This should not be taken to mean that such
an ideal should not be striven for, but simply that here, as otherwise, a man's reach inevitably
exceeds his grasp." Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the
Positive State, 1967 DuxE L.J. 273, 282.
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III. The Supreme Court and Human Dignity
A. The Idea of Human Dignity
One of the values which the Supreme Court should openly espouse is that of
human dignity. In a variety of constitutional contexts, the Court has come close
to justifying its decisions on the basis of human dignity. One of the reasons for
the Court's hesitancy is the considerable difficulty involved in translating human
dignity into a legal concept. Arguably, however, the Court has judicially sanc-
tioned a concern for the value and quality of human life. There are several
contexts in which the Court has breathed the concept of human dignity into
various provisions of the Constitution and thereby given life to otherwise abstract
legal principles.
58
B. The Supreme Court's Implementation of a Human Dignity Standard
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In Weems v. United States,5 9 the defendant was convicted by a Philippine
court of falsifying an official public document. He was sentenced, under the
Spanish Penal Code, to 15 years of cadena. Those sentenced to cadena labored
for the benefit of the state a minimum of 12 years and a day. Chains were
attached to the ankles and wrists of the individual and he was to work at "hard
and painful labor."60 Additional penalties also were imposed: civil interdiction
and subjection to surveillance for life.6" The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and declared the statute unconstitutional. The legal basis for the Court's
decision was the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Notwithstanding the technical legal basis underlying the Weems decision, it
is explainable in terms of human dignity. The Court was troubled by the ex-
tremely harsh nature of cadena. The Court viewed cadena as cruel and unusual
punishment not only because of the physical cruelty of chains and deliberately
inflicted pain, but also because of the political and civil disabilities that followed.62
After serving his sentence, the individual confronted crippling civil incapacities
that relegated him to an inferior social status."3 It is not surprising, then, that
the Court found the penalty of cadena "repugnant to the bill of rights. 64 The
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment did not
necessarily compel the Court's decision. It was the Court's concern for human
dignity that led it to read this value into the otherwise meaningless phrase "cruel
and unusual punishment."
58 SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 710-884.
59 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
60 Id. at 364.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 366.
63 Id.




In United States v. Reynolds," the Supreme Court declared an Alabama
convict-labor statute unconstitutional under the thirteenth amendment.
Reynolds, an employer, paid the fine and court costs of an individual convicted
of larceny, whereupon the convicted prisoner signed a labor contract with
Reynolds. The Alabama statute in question made it a crime for a convict
working under such an arrangement to refuse to work for the employer during
the term of the labor contract. When the laborer refused to continue working for
him, Reynolds procured his arrest for violating the labor contract." Under the
Alabama statute, then, the employer could cause the arrest of the laborer for
violation of the labor contract. The laborer would then be sentenced and
punished for this new offense and would undertake to liquidate his penalty by
signing a new contract of a similar nature. Consequently, the laborer was "kept
chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude to discharge the obligation which
he has incurred to his surety, who has entered into an undertaking with the
State . .. . ,67
Reynolds also may be explained in terms of human dignity. Under the
scheme in Reynolds, the laborer was kept in a condition of peonage, for he was
coerced into compulsory service for the discharge of a debt. There was no
voluntary performance of labor here, for if the laborer broke the labor contract he
was subject to imprisonment, not to an action for damages for breach of contract.
The Court read into the thirteenth amendment the consideration of human
dignity, and struck down the unconscionable arrangement employers enjoyed
with the State of Alabama for cheap convict labor.
3. Due Process
In Rochin v. California,68 three deputy sheriffs forcibly entered Rochin's
home. Inside his bedroom, one of the deputies saw two capsules on a nightstand.
When asked about the capsules, Rochin quickly swallowed them. The three
officers unsuccessfully attempted to extract the capsules. Rochin was then taken
to a hospital where his stomach was pumped, against his will. Two morphine
capsules were discovered, and Rochin was convicted under California's Health
and Safety Code. 9
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because it violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause, however, like
many other constitutional provisions, is an abstraction capable of many inter-
pretations. Rochin is more than a due process case; the due process clause was
simply the vehicle used by the Court to implement the principle of human dig-
nity. Such action by police officials was not compatible with human dignity.
"[T]he proceedings by which the conviction was obtained do more than offend
65 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
66 Id. at 140.
67 Id. at 146-47.
68 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
69 Id. at 166.
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some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime
too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience."7 Such brutality
would "discredit law and thereby... brutalize the temper of society."71 As in
Weems and Reynolds, it was the Court's concern with human dignity that dic-
tated its use of the due process clause to vindicate this value. 2
4. The Right to Travel
In Edwards v. California," the defendant, a United States citizen and Cali-
fornia resident, persuaded his brother-in-law to come to California. Edwards
knew that his brother-in-law was on relief in Texas, and he was consequently
convicted of violating a California statute which prohibited knowingly bringing
a nonresident indigent into the state.74
A majority of the Court found the California statute unconstitutional under
the commerce clause. 5 Justice Douglas, on the other hand, in a concurring
opinion, emphasized that such a statute would
introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system
of government. It would permit those who were stigmatized by a state as
indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of
citizenship.76
Justice Jackson was likewise unpersuaded by the majority's position. To hold
that the measure of an individual's rights is the commerce clause "is likely to
result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human
rights.' 7
Human dignity actually lies at the heart of the Edwards decision. The
majority in Edwards used the commerce clause as the instrument by which it
read human dignity into the law. The remainder of the Court more candidly
relied on the right of national citizenship to protect the dignity of the individual
and his right to travel. Restrictions on the free movement of individuals, in such
circumstances, would limit the opportunity of the individual and separate people
on the basis of class. Both the majority and concurring opinions determined that
such a result would be at loggerheads with the basic value of human dignity.
Clearly, then, the Supreme Court's concern with the value of human dignity
is reflected through the use of a variety of constitutional provisions. Constitu-
tional principles of "cruel and unusual punishment," "involuntary servitude,"
"due process," and "interstate commerce" have and should continue to be ave-
nues for implementing a jurisprudence of human dignity. There is precedent
in Supreme Court decision-making which legally sanctions such a jurisprudence.
70 Id. at 172.
71 Id. at 174.
72 Cf. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
73 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
74 Id. at 171.
75 Id. at 173.
76 Id. at 181.
77 Id. at 182.
78 Cf. City of New York vs. Miln, 36 U.S. (I IPet.) 102 (1837).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The Court, then, was not without precedent in utilizing considerations of human
dignity when it made its momentous decision on school segregation in 1954.
C. Brown and the Findings of the Federal District Court in Milliken
1. Brown v. Board of Education: The Breakthrough
Plessy v. Ferguson"O was the constitutional cornerstone of racial discrimi-
nation in this country. The underlying premise of Plessy was that racial classi-
fication was a neutral principle based on fact and therefore not contrary to the
Constitution. The "separate but equal" doctrine established the constitutional
rule that segregation of the races, as such, was not discriminatory and therefore
not in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
From 1896 to 1954, the doctrine of Plessy was left unquestioned by the Supreme
Court. In 1954, however, the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation"0 that segregation in the public schools was a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause."' "In the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.""2
The Court emphasized the crucial place of education in contemporary American
society.
Today, education is the most important function of state and local govern-
ments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.8 3
Brown was a breakthrough, for it explicitly overruled Plessy84 and sounded
the constitutional death knell for de jure racial segregation in this country.
After Brown, the only question now remaining in cases involving racial segre-
gation is whether the segregation complained of meets the "state action" require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment. Once this requirement is met, the segre-
gation complained should be ruled an unconstitutional violation of the equal
protection clause.
In Brown, then, the Court discarded the "separate but equal" test of Plessy
and ruled that segregation as such was inherently discriminatory and contrary
to the constitutional command of equality; the equal protection clause was given
a new meaning. The Court was concerned with the effect of segregation on
black schoolchildren.
To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
79 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
80 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
81 Id. at 493.
82 Id. at 495.
83 Id. at 493.
84 Id. at 495.
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of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."5
The Court was acutely aware of the gross injustices inherent in racially segregated
schools. The black children in those schools were receiving an inferior education
and were thereby irreversibly disadvantaged. In Brown, the Court read human
dignity into the equal protection clause which changed the meaning given that
clause by Plessy. The Brown Court could have relied on the neutral principle of
"separate but equal," but instead it overturned the principle and read its
concern for the quality of human life into the law.
2. Milliken v. Bradley: Retrenchment
The Supreme Court's decision in Milliken conflicts with Brown's concern
with human dignity. While Brown created the hope that school segregation, and
segregation generally, would eventually come to an end, Milliken, by precluding
the use of a metropolitan busing plan, helps perpetuate school segregation. Mil-
liken flies in the face of Brown's sweeping constitutional command that all forms
of racial segregation which find their source in governmental action be cate-
gorically condemned by the Constitution. The Brown decision emphasized the
values of dignity and equality; the Milliken decision emphasizes legal technicality
and the status quo.
The federal district court in Bradley v. Milliken"8 spent 41 trial days examin-
ing the issues of segregation in Detroit's public schools and governmental in-
volvement in that segregation. 7 The district court found that Detroits resi-
dential segregation was primarily "the result of past and present practices and
customs of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do
restrict the housing opportunities of black people. On the record there can be
no other finding."88 The district court found that governmental action at the
federal, state, and local levels, combined with the actions of private lending in-
stitutions and real estate associations, established and maintained a pattern of
residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area."5 The court
further noted the cause and effect relationship between the residential patterns
and the racial composition of the schools." The district court then carefully
scrutinized the history of the Detroit school system as it involved both local and
state authorities.91 The Detroit Board of Education engaged in numerous prac-
tices which contributed to the segregation of the city's public schools. 2 School
authorities of the State of Michigan were also implicated. "The State and its
agencies, in addition to their general responsibility for and supervision of public
85 Id. at 494.
86 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
87 Id. at 584.







education, have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of segregation
in the Detroit schools."98 The State of Michigan for years refused to provide
funds for the transportation of pupils, regardless of their poverty or distance from
their assigned school. At the same time, mostly white suburban school districts
were receiving funds from the state to support the transportation of pupils." The
state also imposed financial limitations on the Detroit public school system
through the use of a school-aid formula. Michigan's state-aid formula allowed
suburban school districts to make far larger per-pupil expenditures despite less
tax effort; thus the state's school-aid formula had "created and perpetuated
systematic educational inequalities."95 In addition, the Michigan Legislature
passed legislation "to impede, delay, and minimize racial integration in Detroit
schools."9 Act 48 of the Michigan Legislature nurtured a general scheme of
segregation.9"
The district court concluded that both the State of Michigan and the
Detroit Board of Education committed acts which were "causal factors" in the
segregation of Detroit's public schools. In short, the district court found de jure
segregation.9"
In light of Brown's sweeping decision that segregation involves discrimina-
tion, in addition to the detailed findings of fact by the district court, the Supreme
Court's decision in Milliken is a legal and moral failure. It is a legal failure
because it ignores the actual causes of residential and school segregation in
Detroit. It fails to follow the principle laid down in Brown: Segregation means
discrimination whenever there is governmental involvement in the segregation.
Milliken is a moral failure because it deprives many thousands of black school-
children the opportunity for a better education and a more hopeful future. It
ignores the value of human dignity which was sanctioned in the civil rights area
by the Supreme Court in Brown.
In Weems the Court protected the individual from excessive and continuing
cruelty; the Reynolds Court shielded the individual from forced labor for debt;
in Rochin the Court shielded the individual from police brutality; and the
Edwards Court vindicated the individual's right to interstate travel. The Brown
Court protected blacks from state-mandated segregation, a segregation so per-
vasive that it inevitably led to massive disadvantages for blacks. Milliken, then,
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's prior concern with human
dignity. In fact, it is a retreat from the fundamental principle of Brown-that
governmental implication in segregation means unconstitutional discrimination.
The Milliken decision is more than faintly reminiscent of the Civil Rights Cases
and Plessy; once again, purportedly neutral decisions ignored the human needs of
those appealing to the Court. The decisions in these cases emasculated the
egalitarian and humanitarian goals of the fourteenth amendment. Milliken, more
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particularly, is nothing less than an emasculation of the egalitarian and humani-
tarian goals of Brown.
IV. The Possibility of a Jurisprudence of Human Dignity
The pervasive theme of the Declaration of Independence is the equality of
man. From the very beginning of the nation's history, equality has been a funda-
mental tenet of political faith. Of course, the men who wrote the Declaration of
Independence and who framed the Constitution gave equality a narrower mean-
ing than it is given today. To eighteenth century aristocrats, equality was only
available to those of equal status. While it is true that they had a narrow con-
ception of equality, their handiwork served as a catalyst in spreading the ideal of
equality throughout American society.99
It was not until after the Civil War that the concept of political equality
was elevated to a constitutional plane by the radical Republican Congressmen
who sponsored the fourteenth amendment. While the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment represented a step forward, the concept of equality still had not
reached its apex. Equality before the law is scarcely the ultimate stage of an
egalitarian revolution. Today it is becoming increasingly obvious that an em-
phasis on mere legal equality is hopelessly inadequate."' It is imperative that we
broaden our vision. The law must be used not only to protect the political and
civil rights of the individual, but also to establish economic, educational and
social conditions through which the individual's human dignity is realized.01 An
expanded concept of equality becomes virtually synonymous with the concept of
human dignity. Whether the ideal is called human dignity or equality is unim-
portant; what matters is the progress the Supreme Court makes in using this
ideal.
The Supreme Court should use the concept of human dignity as a guide in
race relations cases. By reading into the Constitution values similar to those
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which include econom-
ic and social rights in addition to civil and political rights,"0 2 the Court could
lead American society toward a more humane goal. By expanding the scope of
equality, and by moving beyond the traditional concern for political and civil
rights, the Court could make the concept of human dignity a meaningful reality.
The role of the Supreme Court "must be that of an active participant in govern-
ment, assisting in furthering the democratic ideal. Acting ...as a 'national
conscience,' the Court should help articulate in broad principle the goals of
99 See, e.g., J. BRYCE, THE AwmucAN COMMONWEALTH (1916).
100 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 488 (1968).
101 "The rights of individuals in this country have been largely a collection of political
and civil liberties rooted in a centuries old tradition. More is required than political and
civil rights to secure the dignity of human beings. We must move beyond political and civil
rights and afford protection to economic and social rights as well." T. HESBURGEr, THE
HUMANE IMPERATIvE 33 (1974).
102 Some of the rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the
right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to an adequate edu-




American society." ' Throughout its history, the Court has played an active
part in the affairs of government. Unfortunately, one of the Court's active
roles led to the relegation of blacks to second-class citizenship after the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment. It was the Court that wrote the misguided doc-
trine of "separate but equal" into the Constitution; it was the Court that wrote
Jim Crow into the law of the land.
There is now an urgent need for a jurisprudence of human dignity. Such a
jurisprudence would openly espouse the economic and social rights of the right
to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to an ade-
quate education. Human dignity would consider the gross injustices found in
the nation's urban centers, where blacks are the victims of employment and
housing discrimination, as well as inadequate educational systems. Moreover, it
would mandate affirmative action on the part of government to alleviate the
human suffering caused by decades of prejudice and neglect. Neutral principles
of constitutional law and other forms of pseudo-objectivity will not help solve
these problems. A Court concerned with human dignity, however, could make a
difference. Although the Supreme Court by itself cannot bring about the real-
ization of those rights which make human dignity a meaningful reality, it can
perform a leadership role that prods the Congress and the President to take ap-
propriate action.
John T. Bannon
103 Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Gr.
L. R-v. 661, 689 '(1960).
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